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Abstract 
In the current context of demographic pressures, reforms of PAYG pension systems increase the 
extent to which individuals are responsible for their own retirement planning. The French pension 
system offered high replacement rates. The population used to consider that the State scheme had to 
provide them with an adequat level of pension. In 2003, the pension reform implemented individual 
and professional pension plans. These retirement savings contracts are not well developed. However, 
we observed that individuals prefer contracting life endowment contracts, which are long term savings 
supports, to prepare retirement. Using econometric specifications, we intend to put into perspective the 
households and individual characteristics which explain the holding behaviours of life endowment 
contracts and retirement savings plans. We conclude that the highest professional categories and the 
most educated individuals hold more frequently and simultanesously both types of contracts.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
In the current context of pension reforms and population aging in OECD countries, the 
extent to which people are responsible for their own retirement planning increases.  
To face demographic challenges, reforms encourage private pension funding and increase the 
contributory characteristics of the pension system in OECD countries. Private wealth is an 
important pillar to maintain the standard of living after the retirement. 
In France, the major role of the statutory scheme, the high replacement rates implied a low 
development of voluntary or sectorial pension schemes. A few questions on the French case 
deserve to be addressed as it constitutes a paradox: despite the generous Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
pension system, the household savings rate is high, it amounts to 16% in 2009 (Eurostat), while 
it amounts only to 13.9 in the European Union. However, private pension plans are not well 
developed. Despite the high household savings rate, inequalities in retirement planning remain. 
Among the 50-70 age group, we observe strong inequalities of accumulation. Some households 
retire with a high level of financial and non financial level of assets and other did not save 
enough to maintain their standard of living during the retirement period. 
In 2010, 6.3 billion euros pension benefits were paid under a contract of additional pension, 
equivalent to only 2.3% of the total amount of pensions paid (DREES, 2012). The French 
population used to consider that the PAYG public pension system should finance pensions. The 
pension system being based on an insurance principle and intergenerational risk sharing, 
households used to estimate that, once retired, the public system had to provide them with an 
adequate level of pension. Although the minds are changing, the French case remains a special 
case. 
Funded pensions are recent: individual and professional pension plans4 were introduced 
only in 2003 and are not well developed. However, we observe that French households contract 
frequently life endowment contracts, also called in France “life insurances”. This typical French 
savings vehicle gives the possibility to household to choose between an annuity or a lumpsum at 
the end of the contract.. The first motive to save trough a life endowment contract is the 
retirement planning (28% of annuities holders) (Darmon and Pagenelle, 2005). Until 2004, the 
second and third pillars were, for the most part inaccessible for French workers. The 2003 
reform encouraged individuals to turn to individual or collective savings plans. 
 
In this paper, we intend to better understand what kind of supplementary income sources elder 
may receive after retirement. We focus on the current French pensioners. Using an original 
representative household survey, we define econometric specifications to estimate the effects of 
different socio-demographic determinants on life endowment contracts and retirement savings 
contracts holding. We then use a bivariate probit model to examine the correlation between the 
holding of annuities and retirement savings contracts. Are the two savings contracts 
4 These private plans are called " Plan d'épargne retraite populaire" (PERP), " Plan d'épargne retraite entreprise " 
(PERE) and " Plan d'épargne pour la retraite collectif " (PERCO). 
                                                             
complementary products or substitutable assets? What characteristics impact on such holdings 
among elderly people? The relationship between life endowment contracts and retirement 
savings contracts holding among retirees has not been analyzed before. We consider life 
endowment contracts and individual retirement plans, more precisely financial contracts that 
may provide a monthly or annual sum to an individual in retirement until he dies. By identifying 
factors impacting holding behaviour among the elderly, we aim to define part of the institutional 
framework that could reduce the intragenerational poverty risk. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we present 
briefly the pension system in France and the literature on life endowment contracts and 
individual retirement plan holding. Section III describes the survey and the econometric 
estimates that combine the relationships between life endowment contracts and individual 
retirement savings contracts holding. In the section IV, we report the estimates results. The last 
section offers concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. Retirement and holding behaviour in France 
 
The French retirement system is primarily based on a statutory pay-as-go system. The 
State pension scheme is dependant on the sector of activity in which the worker participates. 
The state pension is calculated on the basis of the person’s wage, rate of contribution, and length 
of contribution. The supplementary schemes, which complement the general State regime and 
are compulsory, are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.  
The 2003 reform encouraged individuals to turn to individual or collective savings plans. This 
reform strongly pushed for an increase in the importance of the second and third pillar. The 
introduction of new savings vehicles encouraged employers to motivate their employees to 
save for retirement. Important tax benefits were introduced in order to develop the private 
sector schemes. Until 2004, only few private disposals, depending on the sector of 
employment, allowed workers to plan individually their retirement. The reform attempted to 
propose more attractive and universal retirement savings vehicles. 
Two new forms of occupational pension funds were implemented. The PERCO 5  is a 
corporate defined contribution scheme. It is a funded scheme in which all employees may 
have access. This scheme benefits from tax incentives. Some employees must request 
membership into this plan, while in other companies enrolment is automatic. At retirement 
age, the individual may choose to receive their pension amount in the form of annuities or 
lump sum capital withdrawal depending on the original collective or employer agreement. 
The PERE 6  plan is a pension scheme offered by insurance companies upon agreement 
between Unions or companies. Company contributions are mandatory and, if defined in the 
5 Plan d'épargne pour la retraite collectif 
6 Plan d’épargne retraite en entreprise 
                                                             
initial agreement, employee contributions can also be compulsory. The pension sum is only 
available upon retirement in the form of annuities.   
The 2003 reform has also widely encouraged the development of privately managed pension 
provision through individual contracts. The PERP7 is an individual, voluntary retirement plan 
running under insurance directives. This optional savings vehicle is available to all 
individuals. It was designed to complement other retirement income sources. By contributing 
regularly to this savings plan, the individual can acquire enough savings to receive an 
additional annuity amount upon retirement.  
However, over the past decades, we observe that French households have been prone to make 
long-term investments by contracting life endowments contracts, also called “life insurance” 
in France. They contract individual retirement savings products more rarely. Life endowment 
contracts are typical French long-term savings vehicles. French households have the 
possibility to contract two types of life insurances: 
 
• Pure life insurances as in other countries: term, or whole-life, policy providing payments 
to beneficiaries if death occurs during the contract, nothing being paid in case of survival 
of the insured. This is actually death insurance. We do not consider this type of contract 
in the article. • What is commonly called "life insurance" in France is real savings product over a single 
period, with the tax benefits of insurance. Life endowment contracts allow funds to grow 
while maintaining a long-term goal: retirement, investment real estate, etc. It also offers 
significant tax benefits for succession. At the end of the contract, the beneficiary may 
receive an annuity or a capital. We consider this savings product. To avoid confusion in 
the article, we use the terms “life annuity” or “life endowment contracts”. 
 
Bernard et al. (2002) show how demographic structure and age impact the holding of life 
annuities or private voluntary pension contracts. The authors test a probit model to explain the 
determinants of endowment insurance and voluntary retirement savings holding. Households 
aged 50 and more hold more contracts than younger households. Whereas the holding of 
complementary pension contracts tends to decrease after the age of 60, that is not the case for 
life insurance contracts. Using the same survey, Arrondel et al. (2003) provide an analysis of the 
socio-economic determinants of life insurance holdings in France. They conclude that French 
households without children buy more life endowment contracts in order to prepare for their 
retirement, whereas households with children prefer pure life insurance in case of death in 
order to protect their family.  
 
In France, the holding behaviour with a retirement related motive8 is consistent with the life 
cycle hypothesis. Using the French Wealth survey (Patrimoine) of 1992, 1998 and 2004, Brun-
Schammé and Duée (2008) distinguish the age effect from the cohort effect by describing the 
long-term assets holding for several cohorts. The holding rate for retirement motive increases 
7 Plan d’épargne retraite populaire 
8 Life endowment contracts, popular savings schemes, retirement savings contracts held specifically to prepare 
the retirement.  
                                                             
significantly among households until the age of 60. The highest holding rate is observed for 
households headed by a 60 years old individual. Then, the holding rate decreases to 5% for 
households aged of 72 years. However, the possession of such long-term assets, for any motive, 
decreases only very slightly after the age of 55. The authors conclude that very few households 
liquidate their retirement related wealth, and change their holding motive. They keep their 
wealth but for other reasons (bequests, disability risk, tax deductions). It appears that 
retirement related savings behaviour depends mainly on the age and the professional status. 
However, financial long term assets holding behaviour, for any motive, highly depends on the 
income level (Brun-Schammé and Duée, 2008). 
Since Brun-Schammé and Duée’s article, new data on holding behaviour, including the 
recent individual and professional pension plans, the PERP and the PERCO, have been published. 
At the end of 2007, 2 million of individuals held a PERP, and 334 000 a PERCO (Croguennec, 
2009). After its introduction in 2003, the development of the PERP experienced an increase of 
6%, and the PERCO 66%, of the covered employees. Before the implementation of these 
retirement pension plans, the possibility the save for retirement through a funded pension plan 
concerned only few professional categories, mainly executives. 30% of the PERP holders belong 
to the 40-49 age group, and 35% of the PERCO holders belong to the 50-59 age group.  
 
 
3. Survey and empirical model 
3.1 The Wealth Survey 
Asset accumulation is linked with various socio-economic characteristics. We aim particularly to 
highlight household’s holding behaviour, linked with the aging risks in a country where the 
retirement income usually depends on the public PAYG pension system.  
We consider savings vehicles (life endowment contracts and retirement savings contracts both 
collective and individual) in phases of accumulation and decumulation. Indeed, although 
individuals retire, they may keep their assets, particularly in the case of life endowment 
contracts. Conversely, they usually liquidate their retirement savings contracts. 
 
We use the latest household survey (The Wealth survey) conducted in France in 2009-2010 by 
the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies - Institut National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE). The database includes a representative sample of 
the French population, consisting in 35729 individuals, belonging to 15006 households. The 
wealth survey is particularly informative about the financial and non-financial assets of the 
households and questions individuals on their income, age, professional category, 
education/training, marital situation, and work status (active, inactive, retired). Furthermore, 
the survey also includes the type of asset held by the household (checking account, savings 
account, real estate, corporate savings, etc.). Retirement pensions, both state and private (type 
and amounts by range), are also reported. 
 
For each pensioner, we consider personal and household characteristics. 21.22% of the 
respondents are retired.  
A sub sample of 3989 pensioners, who filled in the holding questions in the survey, is selected. In 
this sample, pensioners are in average 71 years old, 44.8% of the retired are aged from 60 to 69, 
46.8% from 70 to 85 and 8.4% are aged 85+. The youngest individual is 60 years old, whereas 
the oldest one is aged 99. 
Life endowment contracts are much more developed among pensioners than private retirement 
contracts: 46% hold such a contract or receive an annuity from this contract.  
Only 21% of the sample holds a retirement savings contract. Among retirees, only individuals 
retired between 2004 and 2010 are concerned by the 2003 reform that implemented new 
private retirement savings contracts.  
 
Table I Life endowment contracts and retirement savings contracts holders in the sample 
  
No retirement 
savings 
contract 
Retirement 
savings 
contract 
Total 
No life endowment contract 1764 371 2135 
Life endowment contract  1396 458 1854 
Total 3160 829 3989 
Source: Wealth Survey, 2010 
 
55% of pensioners holding a retirement savings contract hold simultaneously a life endowment 
contract. 56% of pensioners who do not hold retirement savings asset do not hold life 
endowment contract. 83% of retirees having no life endowment contract do not hold any 
retirement savings contract.  
Considering these statistics, we may conclude that both life endowment contracts and 
retirement savings contracts are complementary. However, 75% of life endowment contracts 
holders do not hold any private retirement contracts.  
 
3.2 The estimation method 
 
As a first analysis, we test probit models explaining the probability of annuity ( iac ) and 
retirement savings contracts ( irc ) holding, formulated as: 
 
( ) iiii uXacob +== α1Pr  ( )1,0~ Nui  ( ) iiii uYrcob +== β1Pr  ( )1,0~ Nui  
 
With iX  and iY   the vector of explanatory variables for each individual i  of our sample, and  iu  
the error term. In the second step, we construct a bivariate-probit model to estimate 
simultaneously the probability of holding an annuity and that of holding a private retirement 
savings contract. We assume that the probability of an annuity holding ( iac ) and a retirement 
savings contract ( irc ) holding are interrelated (Greene, 2008).  
The model includes separate probit models with correlated disturbances. Our two binary 
dependant variables represent the probability of holding an annuity contract (
*
iac ), and the 
probability of holding a retirement savings contract (
*
irc ). We assume that these two variables 
represent two interrelated decisions by households. French households have usually made long 
term investments by contracting annuities. New retirement savings contracts have been 
implemented since the 2003 reforms. We estimate a bivariate probit model to highlight the 
correlation between the holding decisions of these two savings vehicles: are they substitutable 
or complementary?  
 
We estimate the following model: ���∗ = �1��1� + �1� ���∗ = �2��2� + �2� 
 
Where ��∗ and ��∗are unobservable and are related to the binary dependant variables ��� and ��� by the following rules: 
 ��� �1 �� �ℎ� ���������� �������� ℎ������ �� ������� ���������0 �� ℎ� �������� ��� ℎ������ ���ℎ �� ������� ��������         
 ��� �1 �� �ℎ� ���������� �������� ℎ������ � ���������� ������ ���������0 �� ℎ� �������� ��� ℎ������ ���ℎ � ������ ��������         
 
�� represent the error terms of the two probit models.  
In the bivariate probit model, we assume that the error terms are correlated: �1� = �� + �1� �2� = �� + �2� 
 
The error terms follow a standard multivariate normal distribution, where V  represents the 
residual covariance matrix, with ρ  as the correlation coefficient. 
 ��1�2� → � ��00� ,�� � = �1 �� 1� 
 
Conducting likelihood ratio tests, our results indicate that the bivariate-probit estimation is 
more efficient than that of two independent probit equations. The probability of annuities 
holding and that of holding a private retirement savings contract are interrelated.  
 
3.3  The variable definitions 
 
We take into account the standard socioeconomic determinants used in the literature: 
professional categories (blue collar, white collar, employed, self-employed), age and life 
expectancy, composition of the family and a dummy of poverty.  
 
We define the exposure-to-poverty threshold at 60% of the median equivalent income in the 
population. Each member of the household is assigned an income calculated using an 
equivalence scale. The economies of scale in housing and the consumption of goods and services 
are considered by controlling for household composition9. We assign the value of 1 to the first 
household member, 0.5 to each additional adult member and 0.3 to each child under 14. This 
methodology has the advantage of illustrating more precisely the standard of living of 
individuals belonging to a household.  
9 Part of the existing literature underlines the potential asymmetry in the management of and access to the 
household’s resources (Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene, 1994; Belleau et Proulx, 2010). 
Nevertheless, assuming that most households share and manage their income fairly, we deflate household 
resources by the number of consumption units in the household. 
                                                             
According to Yieh and Chen (2000), age, gender, the number of children and education affect the 
precautionary savings of consumers. Professional categories might capture a wealth effect and 
could be considered as a proxy of income. Using the 1999 American retirement investment 
survey, Joo and Grable (2000) showed that individuals with higher education higher income, and 
financially literate invest more frequently in a retirement program (Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto, 
2009).  We consider the level of education (i.e. level of diploma) as a proxy of financial literacy.  
Housing may provide a good vehicle for consumption at retirement. We consider a dummy 
variable indicating whether the household is homeowner or not. Homeownership may 
negatively affect the demand for endowment insurance and retirement savings if it is considered 
as a partial substitute for precautionary savings. Conversely, if homeownership and other asset 
holding are complementary, it could positively affect such demand.  
Bloom et al. (2003) argued that higher life expectancy should lead to an increase in 
precautionary savings. To analyze the longevity effect, we introduce a variable of life 
expectancy. 
4. Results  
We consider firstly the last professional category of the current retired. Our results show a great 
difference between professional categories. Indeed, the probability of holding a life endowment 
contract is weaker for employees and blue-collar workers (See table II of the appendix). 
Executives and shopkeepers have a higher probability of holding such a contract than the 
intermediate professional category. Observation of the marginal effects confirms that the 
professional category impacts on the probability of holding a life endowment contract: having 
been an Executive increases the probability of holding such a contract by about 7.4% at the age 
of 60, 70 and 80 (See table III in appendix). Conversely, this probability decreases if the 
individual has been an Employee or a Blue-collar worker. The negative marginal effect increases 
with age for these two categories: at the age of 60 having been an Employee decreases the 
probability of holding a life endowment contract by 6.8%. At the age of 80, this negative 
probability amounts to 7%. The probability reaches 8% for Blue-collar workers at the age of 60 
and to 8.3% at the age of 80. In other words, this marginal effect increases slightly with age, 
whereas it remains stable for the higher professional categories. The negative impact is 
reinforced with age.   
Individual retirement contract holding is significant only among Executives. The marginal effect 
related to Executives workers is significant: the probability of holding a retirement savings 
contract increases to 7.6% at 60 if the individual was an Executive during their active life (See 
table IV). The marginal effect decreases with age: it amounts to 6.4% for Executives at 80. The 
oldest pensioners in our sample are not concerned by the 2003 pension reform. Consequently, 
they saved less for retirement than younger retirees who had the possibility to contract at the 
end of their career a PERP, a PERCO or a PERE. 
Those who lack literacy are much less likely to plan for retirement. Indeed, the population group 
having a low level of education do not hold any life endowment contract or retirement savings 
contract. This result is conform to Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto (2009). The population group 
having a high level of education are most likely to be financially sophisticated. At the age of 60, 
the probability to hold simultaneously a life endowment contract and a retirement savings 
contracts increases of 12% if people attained a high level of education.  
There is a strong relationship between homeownership and life endowment contracts holding. 
Being a homeowner impacts positively the holding. The marginal effect of homeownership on 
such a contract holding increases slightly with age: it attains 23.2% at 60 years old and increases 
to 24.4% at 80 years old (See table III in appendix). However, we still expected to find a 
significant impact of homeownership on retirement savings contract holding. Indeed, 
homeownership allows retirees to improve their living standard. It prevents them from paying a 
rent at old ages.  Homeownership is not a significant variable to explain retirement savings. 
 
Life expectancy has a statistically significant impact on holding behaviour. It impacts positively 
on life endowment contracts and negatively on retirement savings holding. In other words, 
individuals expecting a long period of retirement tend to accumulate more through a life 
endowment contract. This savings vehicle may be considered as precautionary savings in order 
to finance, for instance, expenditure on long-term care. When life expectancy increases by one 
year, the annuity holding increases by 0.4%. Conversely, when an individual anticipates living 
longer, they neither keep their retirement contracts nor receive an annuity from such contracts. 
We conclude that the older French households were not used to preparing for their retirement 
individually. Given the generous retirement pension system and the low development of private 
retirement disposals, they did not save for their retirement through retirement savings 
contracts. The marginal effect of the life expectancy variable on retirement savings contracts 
holding attains -0.4%. 
Family composition may affect the life endowment contracts holding behaviour.  Adults 
probably aim to accumulate wealth in order to allow bequests to their children. However, at the 
same time, it may be more difficult to save when parents have to bring up children. In the case of 
retired people, it seems that only individuals without children continue to hold life endowment 
contracts or retirement savings contracts after retirement. Indeed, retirees still raising children 
are probably not able to save. Being a couple, widowed or single without any child increases the 
probability of holding an annuity by about 11 to 15%. This marginal effect remains stable with 
age. However, household composition does not impact on retirement savings contract holding, a 
result which may be explained by the fact that this savings vehicle applies to individuals 
preparing for their own retirement when it is contracted.  
Being poor impacts significantly and negatively on the probability of holding an annuity contract 
or a retirement savings contract. The marginal effect of poverty on the holding behaviour is 
significant and negative: the probability of holding an annuity decreases by 10.8% at the age of 
60 for poor people. This probability decreases to 11.2% at the age of 80. In other words the 
impact of poverty increases with age. The negative impact is less strong on retirement savings 
contract holding: the probability of holding decreases by 5.7% at the age of 60 for an individual 
under the exposure-to-poverty threshold. In this case, the intensity of the marginal effect 
decreases with age. The probability amounts to 4.6% at the age of 80. 
 
We find a positive and significant correlation of unobserved disturbance in the two probits when 
estimating the biprobit. Consequently, some individual characteristics that explain the holding of 
life endowment contracts may also explain the detention of retirement savings. This is 
particularly the case for the following variables: Executive, Poor, and Master’s degree. It puts 
into perspective the importance of literacy and standard of living in the retirement planning. 
However, other parameter  estimates, such as age or household composition, are quite different, 
suggesting that life endowment contracts and retirement savings assets may be held by different 
people. Given the very different levels of development of life endowment contracts and 
retirement savings vehicles, it is difficult to definitively assert that the two types of contracts are 
complementary. However, the majority of retirement savings holders also have a life 
endowment contract. 
 
Although the correlation coefficient is not very large, it is significant. Consequently, the bivariate 
probit approach is the preferred method for putting into perspective the positive correlation 
between life endowment and retirement savings vehicles. The marginal effect of the professional 
categories on the probability of simultaneously holding an annuity and a retirement savings 
vehicle increases between the age of 60 and the age of 70. This probability attains 5.7% for older 
Executives at the age of 60 (See table V) and 6.1% at the age of 70. The marginal effects are 
negative for employees and blue-collar workers. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
By using micro data from household surveys on income and wealth, we provide an original 
empirical study to analyse the holding behaviour among elderly people. 
We found the existence of potential supplementary income sources among French pensioners. 
Retirement savings and life annuities could be considered as good vehicles for receiving a 
supplementary retirement income. France is an interesting case compared to others OECD 
countries, firstly, because occupational plans are not developed in this country. Secondly, 
individuals are not made aware of the need to save for their retirement in the context of 
generous public pension system. We analyse in this paper the relationship between holding 
rates and socio-demographic characteristics among retirees. We take into account the standard 
socioeconomic determinants used in the literature: professional categories (blue collars, white 
collars, employees, self-employed), age and life expectancy, composition of the family and a 
dummy of poverty. Our results show that life endowment contracts holding is weaker for 
employees and blue-collar workers. Conversely, Executives tend to hold these assets more 
frequently. People with a high level of diploma hold more frequently an annuity contract and a 
retirement savings contract. A high level of diploma provides them with a better financial 
awareness.  
We also find a impact of life expectancy on holding behaviour. However, it impacts annuities 
holding positively and retirement savings contract holding negatively. In other words, when 
expecting a long period of retirement, individuals tend to accumulate more through life annuity 
contracts. This savings vehicle may be considered as precautionary savings, in order to finance 
the long-term care expenditures for instance.  
Family composition also affects savings behaviour. Our models put into perspective the impact 
of this composition on the holding of life annuities.  Elderly people probably aim to accumulate 
wealth in order to bequeath part to their children.  
Finally, poorer retirees’ access to annuity and retirement contracts is very weak. The 
government could encourage private savings through annuity contracts or retirement savings 
among poor people by proposing matching contributions according to the number of children 
and disposable income within the household. Among non-poor people, the issue is different: as 
they prefer contracting life annuities, it could be useful to make the private retirement contract 
more attractive by implementing new fiscal incentives. 
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Appendix 
Table II Results of the estimates 
   
Biprobit 
 
Probit of life 
endowment 
contracts holding 
Probit of 
individual 
retirement savings 
contract holding 
Probability of life 
endowment 
contracts holding 
Probability of 
individual 
retirement savings 
contract holding 
Individual 
retirement 
savings 
0.188*** 
- - - 
(0.051) 
Life 
endowment 
contracts 
- 
0.177*** 
- - 
(0.048) 
Farmer 
0,02 -0,135 0.02 -0.133 
(0.083) (0.095) (0.084) (0.098) 
Shopkeeper 
0,177** 0,106 0,184** 0,119 
(0.077) (0.086) (0.077) (0.086) 
Executives 
0.188** 0.242*** 0.202*** 0.254*** 
-0,077 (0.082) (0.077) (0.082) 
Self employed: 
lawyer, doctor 
0.160 -0.026 0.157 -0.015 
(0.17) (0.167) (0.169) (0.168) 
White Collar 
workers 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Employee 
-0.179*** -0,11 -0.185*** -0.122 
(0.069) (0.079) (0.069) -0,079 
Blue Collar 
workers 
-0.213*** -0,0004 -0.213*** -0.013 
(0.072) (0.077) (0.071) -0,076 
Homeowner 
0.665*** -0.045 0.663*** -0,005 
(0.071) (0.075) (0.71) (0.074) 
Mortgage -0,02 0,012 -0,02 0,011 
(0.059) (0.064) (0.059) -0,064 
Life 
Expectancy 
0.011*** -0.013*** 0.011*** -0.013*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Couple with 
children 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Couple 
without any 
child 
0.307*** -0,007 0.307*** 0,011 
(0.099) (0.103) (0.099) (0.103) 
Widowed with 
children 
0.013 -0,101 0,009 -0.101 
(0.192) (0.22) (0.191) (0.220) 
Widowed 
without any 
child 
0.386*** 0,051 0.390*** 0,074 
(0.112) (0.118) (0.112) (0.118) 
Single with 
children 
0,083 -0,054 0,08 -0.051 
(0.313) (0.331) (0.317) (0.331) 
Single without 
any child 
0.278** 0,159 0.287** 0,175 
(0.117) (0.122) (0.117) (0.122) 
Poor 
-0.288*** -0.201*** -0.298*** -0.218*** 
(0.065) (0.074) (0.065) (0.074) 
Age 60-64 
-0.187*** 0,106 -0.181*** 0.094 
(0.063) (0.067) (0.063) (0.067) 
Age 65-69 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Age 70-74 
-0.090 0.127** -0.083 0.121* 
(0.064) (0.070) (0.064) (0.070) 
Age 75-79 
-0.101 0,064 -0.098 0.062 
(0.068) (0.075) (0.068) (0.075) 
Age 80+ 
-0,027 -0.174** -0.030 -0.176** 
(0.069) (0.078) (0.069) (0.078) 
Master's 
0.300*** 0.486*** 0.331*** 0.504*** 
degree (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) 
Bachelor's 
degree 
0.117 0.122 0.124 0.129 
(0.097) (0.105) (0.097) (0.105) 
High School 
diploma 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
No diploma 
-0,289*** 0.069 -0,285*** 0.049 
(0.078) (0.088) (0.078) (0.087) 
Intercept 
-0.930*** -0.732*** -0.884*** -0.693*** 
(0.171) (-0,173) (0.171) (0.174) 
Rho - - 0.108*** 
Test Rho=0, 
Chi2(1) 
    13,23 
Chi2 457.67*** 146.86*** 577.17*** 
N 3989 
 
Table III Significant marginal effects on life endowment contracts holding at the ages of 60, 70 and 
80 
 
60 70 80 
Individual 
retirement 
savings 
0.073*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 
Executives 0.07** 0.074** 0.075** 
Shopkeeper 0.070** 0.070** 0.070** 
Employee -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.070*** 
Blue Collar 
workers 
-0.081*** -0.082*** -0.083*** 
Homeowner 0.232*** 0.239*** 0.244*** 
Life Expectancy 0.004** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
Couple without 
any child 
0.117*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 
Widowed 
without any 
child 
0.152*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
Single without 
any child 
0.109** 0.110** 0.111** 
Poor -0.108*** -0.110*** -0.112*** 
Master's degree 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
No diploma -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.114*** 
Marginal effect 0,4 0,43 0,45 
 
 
 
Table IV Significant marginal effects on retirement savings contracts holding at the ages of 60, 70 
and 80 
 
60 70 80 
Annuity 
holding 
0.053*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 
Executives 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.064*** 
Life Expectancy -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
Poor -0.57** -0.58** -0.46** 
Master's 
degree 
0.165*** 0.166*** 0.142*** 
Marginal effect 0,223 0,23 0,163 
 
 
 
 
Table V Significant marginal effects on the probability to hold simultaneously a life endowment 
contract and a retirement savings contract, at the ages of 60, 70 and 80 
 
60 70 80 
Shopkeeper 0.035** 0.036** 0.028** 
Executives 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.05*** 
Employee -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.025*** 
Blue Collar 
workers 
-0.020* -0.021* -0.015 
Homeowner 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.041*** 
Couple 
without any 
child 
0.028* 0,029* 0,021 
Widowed 
0.046** 0.048** 0,036* 
without any 
child 
Single without 
any child 
0.053** 0.057** 0.045** 
Poor -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.039*** 
Master's 
degree 
0.121*** 0.128*** 0.109*** 
Marginal effect 0,102 0,112 0,084 
 
 
